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Abstract:
This paper is focused on detecting and analyzing the Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks in cloud computing environments. This type of attacks is often the
source of cloud services disruptions. Our solution is to combine the evidences obtained
from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) deployed in the virtual machines (VMs) of
the cloud systems with a data fusion methodology in the front-end. Speciﬁcally, when
the attacks appear, the VM-based IDS will yield alerts, which will be stored into the
Mysql database placed within the Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU) of the front-end server.
We propose a quantitative solution for analyzing alerts generated by the IDSs, using
the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) operations in 3-valued logic and the fault-tree
analysis (FTA) for the mentioned ﬂooding attacks. At the last step, our solution uses
the Dempsters combination rule to fuse evidence from multiple independent sources.
Keywords: cloud computing, cloud security, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks, Intrusion Detection Systems, data fusion, Dempster-Shafer theory.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing technology is in continuous development and with numerous challenges
regarding security. In this context, one of the main concerns for cloud computing is represented by
the trustworthiness of cloud services. This problem requires prompt resolution because otherwise
organizations adopting cloud services would be exposed to increased expenditures while at a
greater risk. A survey conducted by International Data Corporation (IDC) in August 2008
conﬁrms that security is the major barrier for the cloud users.
There are two things that cloud service providers should guarantee all the time: connectivity
and availability, and if there are not met, the entire organizations will suﬀer high costs [1].
This paper is focused on detecting and analyzing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
in cloud computing environment. This type of attacks is often the source of cloud services
disruptions. One of the eﬃcient methods for detecting DDoS is to use the Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS), in order to assure usable cloud computing services [2]. However, IDS sensors
have the limitations that they yield massive amount of alerts and produce high false positive
rates and false negative rates [3].
Copyright c 2006-2013 by CCC Publications
Detecting DDoS Attacks in Cloud Computing Environment 71
With regards to these IDS issues, our proposed solution aims to detect and analyze Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in cloud computing environments, using Dempster-
Shafer Theory (DST) operations in 3-valued logic and Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) for each VM-
based Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The basic idea is to obtain information from multiple
sensors, which are deployed and conﬁgured in each virtual machine (VM). The obtained infor-
mation is integrated in a data fusion unit, which takes the alerts from multiple heterogeneous
sources and combines them using the Dempster’s combination rule. Our approach quantitatively
represents the imprecision and eﬃciently utilizes it in IDS to reduce the false alarm rates.
Speciﬁcally, our solution combines the evidences obtained from Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) deployed in the virtual machines (VMs) of the cloud system with a data fusion method-
ology within the front-end.
Our proposed solution can also solve the problem of analysing the logs generated by sensors,
which seems to be a big issue [4].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces Dempster-Shafer
Theory. Section 3 presents the related work of IDS in Cloud Computing and the related work of
IDS using data fusion. Section 4 introduces the proposed solution of detecting DDoS attacks in
Cloud Computing. Finally, in section 5 the paper presents the concluding remarks.
2 Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST)
Dempster-Shafer Theory is established by two persons: Arthur Dempster, who introduced it
in the 1960’s and Glenn Shafer, who developed it in the 1970’s [5].
As an extension of Bayesian inference, Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) of Evidence is a
powerful method in statistical inference, diagnostics, risk analysis and decision analysis. While
in the Bayesian method probabilities are assigned only for single elements of the state space
(
),in DST probabilities are assigned on mutually exclusive elements of the power sets of possible
states [6], [7].
According to DST method, for a given state space (
) the probability (called mass) is allo-
cated for the set of all possible subsets of 
, namely 2
 elements.
Consequently, the state space (
) is also called frame of discernment, whereas the assignment
procedure of probabilities is called basic probability assignment (bpa) [6], [7], [8].
We will apply the particular case of DST, i.e., the DST operations in 3-valued logic using the
fault-tree analysis (FTA), adopted by Guth (1991) and also used in Popescu, et al. (2010).
Thus, if a standard state space 
 is (True, False), then 2
 should have 4 elements: { ,
True, False, (True, False) }. The (True, False) element describes the imprecision component
introduced by DST, which refers to the fact of being either true or false, but not both. DST is a
useful method for fault-tree analysts in quantitatively representing the imprecision [8]. Another
advantage of DST is it can eﬃciently be utilized in IDS to reduce the false alarm rates by the
representation of ignorance [6], [7], [10].
For the reason that in DST the [sum of all masses] = 1 and m() = 0,we have the following
relation:
m(True) +m(False) +m(True; False) = 1 (1)
In order to analyze the results of each sensor we’ll use the fault tree analysis, which can be
realized by boolean OR gate. Table 1 describes the Boolean truth table for the OR gate.
From Table 1 we have:
m(A) = (a1; a2; a3) = fm(T );m(F );m(T; F )g (2)
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Table 1: BOOLEAN TRUTH TABLE FOR THE OR GATE
b1 b2 b3
_ T F (T,F)
a1 T T T T
a2 F T F (T,F)
a3 (T,F) T (T,F) (T,F)
m(B) = (b1; b2; b3) = fm(T );m(F );m(T; F )g (3)
) m(A _B) = (a1b1 + a1b2 + a1b3 + a2b1 + a3b1; a2b2; a2b3 + a3b2 + a3b3) (4)
m(A _B) = (a1 + a2b1 + a3b1; a2b2; a2b3 + a3b2 + a3b3) (5)
At the last step, our solution applies the Dempster’s combination rule, which allows fusing
evidences from multiple independent sources using a conjunctive operation (AND) between two
bpa’s m1 and m2 , called the joint m12 [11]:
m12(A) =
P
B
T
C=Am1(B)m2(C)
1 K ; (6)
when : A 6= 
m12() = 0
and K =
P
B
T
C=m1(B)m2(C)
The factor 1-K, called normalization factor, is constructive for entirely avoiding the conﬂict
evidence.
Data fusion is also applied in real world examples: robotics, manufacturing, remote sensing
and medical diagnosis, as well in military threat assessment and weather forecast systems [12].
Sentz and Ferson (2002) demonstrated in their study that Dempster’s combination rule is
suitable for the case that the sources of evidences are reliable and a minimal conﬂict or irrelevant
conﬂict is generated.
3 Related Work
3.1 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in Cloud Computing
One of the IDS strategies proved reliable in cloud computing environments is its applicability
to each virtual machine. This is the method we’ll choose for our proposed solution. Mazzariello,
et al. (2010) presented and evaluated this method in comparison with another IDS deployment
strategy, which uses single IDS near the cluster controller. IDS applied to each virtual machine
in cloud computing platform eliminates the overloading problem, because in a way the network
traﬃc is split to all IDSs. Thus, applying IDS to each virtual machine gets rid of the issue of the
IDS strategy near the cluster controller, which tends to be overloaded because of its necessity to
monitor all the supposed traﬃc from the cloud computing infrastructure. Another advantage of
this strategy as described by Roschke, et al. (2009) is the beneﬁt of reducing the impact of the
possible attacks by the IDS Sensor VMs.
However, the limitation of IDS strategy applied to each virtual machine is the missing of the
correlation phase, which is suggested in the future work by Mazzariello, et al. (2010).
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The correlation phase will be included in our proposed solution, because beside the IDS for
each virtual machine, our IDS cloud topology will include a Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU) on the
front-end, with the purpose of obtaining and controlling the alerts received from the IDS sensor
VMs as presented by Roschke, et al. (2009) in their theoretical IDS architecture for cloud, which
utilizing an IDS Management Unit.
Compared to Roschke, et al. (2009) who suggested the utilization of IDMEF (Intrusion
Detection Message Exchange) standard, a useful component for storage and exchange of the
alerts from the management unit, the alerts in our proposed solution will be stored into the
Mysql database of Cloud Fusion Unit. The Cloud Fusion Unit will add the capacity to analyze
the results using the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) of evidence in 3-valued logic and the Fault-
Tree Analysis for the IDS of each virtual machine and at the end the results of the sensors will
be fused using Dempster’s combination rule.
A similar method of using a IDS Management Unit is proposed in Dhage, et al. (2011),
who presented a theoretical model of an IDS model in cloud computing, by using a single IDS
controller, which creates a single mini IDS instance for each user. This IDS instance can be
used in multiple Node controllers and a node controller can contain IDS instances of multiple
users. The analysis phase of the mini IDS instance for each user takes place in the IDS controller.
Compared with Roschke, et al. (2009) where the emphasis is on how to realize the synchronization
and integration of the IDS Sensor VMs, in Dhage, et al. (2011) the focus is to provide a clear
understanding of the cardinality used in the basic architecture of IDS in cloud infrastructure.
Applying the IDS for each virtual machine is an idea suggested also by Lee, et al. (2011), who
increases the eﬀectiveness of IDS by assigning a multi-level intrusion detection system and the log
management analysis in cloud computing. In this sense the users will receive appropriate level
of security, which will be emphasized on the degree of the IDS applied to the virtual machine,
and as well on the prioritization stage of the log analysis documents. This multi-level security
model solves the issue of using eﬀective resources.
Lo, et al. (2010) proposed a cooperative IDS system for detecting the DoS attacks in Cloud
Computing networks, which has the advantage of preventing the system from single point of
failure attack, even if it is a slower IDS solution than a pure Snort based IDS. Thus, the framework
proposed by Lo, et al. (2010) is a distributed IDS system, where each IDS is composed of three
additional modules: block, communication and cooperation, which are added into the Snort IDS
system.
3.2 IDS using Dempster-Shafer theory
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) is an eﬀective solution for assessing the likelihood of DDoS
attacks, which was demonstrated by several research papers in the context of network intrusion
detection systems. Dissanayake (2008) presented a survey upon intrusion detection using DST.
Our study is to detect DDoS attacks in cloud computing environments. Dempster-Shafer
Theory (DST) is used to analyze the results received from each sensor (i.e. VM-based IDS).
Data used in experiments using DST vary: Yu and Frincke (2005) used DARPA DDoS
intrusion detection evaluation datasets, Chou et al. (2008) used DARPA KDD99 intrusion
detection evaluation dataset, Chen and Aickelin (2006) used the Wisconsin Breast cancer dataset
and IRIS plant data, while others scientists generated their own data [7]. The data to be used in
our proposed solution will be generated by ourselves, by performing DDoS attacks using speciﬁc
tools against the VM-based IDS.
Siaterlis, et al. (2003) and Siaterlis and Maglaris (2005) performed a similar study of detecting
DDoS using data fusion and their ﬁeld was an operational university campus network, while in
our solution the DDoS attacks are proposed to be detected and analyzed in our private cloud
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computing environment.
Additionally, we consider to analyze the attacks generated against the TCP, UDP, ICMP
packets, like Siaterlis, et al. (2003) and Siaterlis and Maglaris (2005). However, instead of
applying DST on the state space 
 = fNormal; UDP   flood; SY N   flood; ICMP   floodg,
our study uses DST operations in 3-valued logic as suggested by Guth (1991) for the same
ﬂooding attacks: TCP-ﬂood, UDP-ﬂood, ICMP-ﬂood, for each VM-based IDS. Like Siaterlis
and Maglaris (2005), Chatzigiannakis, et al., (2007) chosen the same frame of discernment, while
Hu, et al. (2006) used a state space: {Normal, TCP, UDP and ICMP}.
Furthermore, compared with the study performed by Siaterlis, at al. (2003) and Siaterlis and
Maglaris (2005), who use a minimal neural network at the sensor level, our proposed solution will
assign the probabilities using: DST in 3-valued logic, the pseudocode and the fault tree analysis.
Whilst the computational complexity of DST is increasing exponentially with the number of
elements in the frame of discernment [12], the DST 3-valued logic proposed to be used in our
research will not encounter this issue, which will meet the eﬃciency requirements in terms of
both detection rate and computation time [15].
Finally, the data fusion of the evidences obtained from sensors studied by Siaterlis and
Maglaris (2005) will be used in our study. The data fusion will be realized using the Dempster-
Shafer combination rule, which was demonstrated in Siaterlis and Maglaris (2005) for its ad-
vantages, i.e., maximization of DDoS true positive rates and minimization of the false positive
alarm rate, by combining the evidence received from sensors. Therefore, the work of cloud
administrators will be alleviated, whereas the number of alerts will decrease.
4 Proposed Solution
In order to detect and analyze Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in cloud com-
puting environments we propose a solution as presented in Figure 1. For illustration purpose, a
private cloud with a front-end and three nodes is set up. Whilst the detection stage is executed
within the nodes, more precisely inside the virtual machines (VMs), where the Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDSs) are installed and conﬁgured; the attacks assessment phase is handled inside
the front-end server, in the Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU).
The ﬁrst step in our solution includes the deployment stage of a private cloud using Euca-
lyptus open-source version 2.0.3. The topology of the implemented private cloud is: a front-end
(with Cloud Controller, Walrus, Cluster Controller, Storage Controller) and a back-end (i.e.
three nodes). The Managed networking mode is chosen because of the advanced features that it
provides and Xen hypervisor is used for virtualization.
Then, the VM-based IDS are created, by installing and conﬁguring Snort into each VM. The
reason of using this IDS location is because the overloading problems can be avoided and the
impact of possible attacks can be reduced [2], [13].
These IDSs will yield alerts, which will be stored into the Mysql database placed within the
Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU) of the front-end server. A single database is suggested to be used
in order to reduce the risk of losing data, to maximize the resource usage inside the VMs and
to simplify the work of cloud administrator, who will have all the alerts situated in the same
place. A similar idea of obtaining and controlling the alerts received from the IDS Sensor VMs
using an IDS Management Unit was presented by Roschke, et al. (2009) as a theoretical IDS
architecture for cloud. A similar method of using an IDS Management Unit is proposed in
Dhage, et al. (2011). However, our solution adds the capacity to analyse the results using the
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence in 3-valued logic.
As showed in Figure 1, the Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU) comprises 3 components: Mysql
database, bpas calculation and attacks assessment.
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Figure 1: IDS Cloud Topology
I. Mysql database
The Mysql database is introduced with the purpose of storing the alerts received from the
VM-based IDS. Furthermore, these alerts will be converted into Basic Probabilities Assignments
(bpas), which will be calculated using the pseudocode below.
II. Basic probabilities assignment (bpa’s) calculation
For calculating the basic probabilities assignment, ﬁrst we decide on the state space 
. In this
paper we use DST operations in 3-valued logic {True, False, (True, False)} Guth (1991) for the
following ﬂooding attacks: TCP-ﬂood, UDP-ﬂood, ICMP-ﬂood, for each VM-based IDS. Thus,
the analyzed packets will be: TCP, UDP and ICMP. Further, a pseudocode for converting the
alerts received from the VM-based IDS into bpas is provided. The purpose of this pseudocode
is to obtain the following probabilities of the alerts received from each VM-based IDS:
(mUDP (T );mUDP (F );mUDP (T; F ))
(mTCP (T );mTCP (F );mTCP (T; F ))
(mICMP (T );mICMP (F );mICMP (T; F ))
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Figure 2: BPA’s calculation
Pseudocode for converting the alerts into bpa’s:
For each node
Begin
For each X 2 {UDP; TCP; ICMP}:
Begin
1: Query the alerts from the database when a X attack occurs for the speciﬁed hostname
2: Query the total number of possible X alerts for each hostname
3: Query the alerts from the database when X attack is unknown
4: Calculate the Belief (True) for X, by dividing the result obtained at step 1 with the result
obtained at step 2
5: Calculate the Belief (True, False) for X, by dividing the result obtained at step 3 with the
result obtained at step 2
6: Calculates Belief (False) for X: 1- Belief (True) - Belief (True, False)
end
end
Furthermore, after obtaining the probabilities for each attack packet (i.e. UDP, TCP, ICMP)
for each VM-based IDS, the probabilities for each VM-based IDS should be calculated following
the fault-tree as shows in Figure 2. Figure 2 reveals only the calculation of the probabilities (i.e.
mS1(T );mS1(F );mS1(T; F )) for the ﬁrst VM-based IDS.
Thus, using the DST with fault-tree analysis we can calculate the belief (Bel) and plausibility
(Pl) values for each VM-based IDS:
Bel(S1) = mS1(T ) (7)
Pl(S1) = mS1(T ) +mS1(T; F ) (8)
III. Attacks assessment
The attacks assessment consists of data fusion of the evidences obtained from sensors by
using the Dempster’s combination rule, with the purpose of maximizing the DDoS true positive
rates and minimizing the false positive alarm rate. mS1;S2(T ) can be calculated using Table 2
and equation (6).
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Table 2: BOOLEAN TRUTH TABLE FOR THE OR GATE
mS1(T) mS1(F) mS1(T,F)
mS2(T) mS1(T) mS2(T) mS1(F) mS2(T) mS1(T,F) mS2(T)
mS2(F) mS1(T) mS2(F) mS1(F) mS2(F) mS1(T,F) mS2(F)
mS2(T,F) mS1(T) mS2(T,F) mS1(F) mS2(T,F) mS1(T,F) mS2(T,F)
5 Conclusions
To detect and analyze Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in cloud computing
environments we have proposed a solution using Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) operations in
3-valued logic and the Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) for each VM-based Intrusion Detection System
(IDS). Our solution quantitatively represents the imprecision and eﬃciently utilizes it in IDS to
reduce the false alarm rates by the representation of the ignorance.
Whilst the computational complexity of DST is increasing exponentially with the number of
elements in the frame of discernment [12], the DST 3-valued logic in our solution does not have
this issue, which meets the eﬃciency requirements in terms of both detection rate and computa-
tion time. At the same time, the usability requirement has been accomplished, because the work
of cloud administrators will be alleviated by using the Dempster rule of evidence combination
whereas the number of alerts will decrease and the conﬂict generated by the combination of
information provided by multiple sensors is entirely eliminated.
To sum up, by using DST our proposed solution has the following advantages: to accom-
modate the uncertain state, to reduce the false negative rates, to increase the detection rate, to
resolve the conﬂicts generated by the combination of information provided by multiple sensors
and to alleviate the work for cloud administrators.
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